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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Defendant. 
Both parties agree this relationship has irreconcilable 
differences. Each of the parties is granted a divorce against 
the other on the grounds that there are irreconcilable 
differences between the parties. The divorce shall become final 
upon signing and entry. 
The problem here is the division of property and question 
of alimony. Plaintiff claims the home was given to her by the 
defendant in exchange for any interest in the business. 
Defendant claim is that the title to the property was placed in 
the plaintiff's name in order to protect it because the business 
was failing. He testified that the banks wanted the home placed 
for additional security and he would not do this. I hold that 
the property was placed in the plaintiff's name to protect it 
from business failure and that the home is a marital asset. The 
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business did fail and the parties divided up some cash that was 
approximately $10,000.00 as defendant's portion and neither 
plaintiff or defendant made the claim that this belonged to the 
defendant as the remains of the business. It was in fact left 
with the plaintiff when defendant went looking for work. The 
evidence does show that the initial payment on the family home 
came from the plaintiff's home that she had prior to this 
marriage. Plaintiff's claim for $19,672.00 which was the down 
payment on the new home is awarded to the plaintiff. He has 
purchased an additional home, furniture, and vehicles since the 
separation. The evidence indicates that none of these has any 
equity as the amounts owed are equal to the value. The 
household furniture and fixtures in the family home in Ogden 
have not been valued. The furniture, fixture, and personal 
property in plaintiff's possession is awarded to her. The 
furniture, vehicles, and property in defendant's possession is 
awarded to him, the home is to be divided as a martial asset. 
The parties were married fourteen years prior to the 
failure of the business and the defendant leaving and looking 
for employment. At the present time it is a eighteen year 
marriage. This is not an instance were plaintiff stayed home 
and raised the children while the defendant progressed through 
the business world to arrive at a favorable position. The 
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plaintiff had four children prior to her marriage to the 
defendant and the defendant accepted them as family and assisted 
in their growth and well being. Defendant's position in the 
business world was arrived at after his separation from the 
plaintiff; The evidence shows that he still looks at her 
children as his family. It also supports his version that he 
wanted her to join him in Las Vegas but she refused. She claims 
they did not discuss her moving, however she does acknowledge 
that they did discuss renting out the home here in Ogden. 
This is also not a case were plaintiff has become 
accustomed to a high standard of living. Prior to defendant's 
business failing the evidence is that he was grossing $500.00 
per week. This is a gross of $26,000.00 a year which was used 
for the family needs. His tax returns indicate actual income 
considerably less. Plaintiff is now employed part time at 
Internal Revenue Service as a GS-5 Step 1 with a gross yearly 
salary of $16,973. Being part time her gross pay was $8,280.00 
in addition thereto she drew unemployment for ten weeks which 
would give her a gross $9,780. Her testimony was that when she 
goes back to work this year it will be at an increased amount. 
Employment history indicates since she graduated from high 
school in 1953 she has basically worked in clerking positions or 
assembly line positions she has never earned high income. Her 
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health is good and she is suffering no disabilities. Evidence 
shows that by leaving the area the defendant was able to go to 
work for Smith's and at one time was a store manager. By reason 
of his contracting rheumatoid arthritis he has had to downgrade 
his job to that of a buyer. Evidence indicates his income will 
be approximately $56,000. When defendant left he did not 
totally abandon plaintiff. He left between $8,000.00 and 
$10,000.00 cash which she could use for house payments and 
payment of bills and in addition thereto she has sold off some 
property like the recreational vehicle for some $9,000.00 plus 
he did send her some funds. Plaintiff did obtain a temporary 
order of $1,500.00 per month alimony. Defendant filed an 
objection to the request for temporary alimony but he was not 
present at the hearing and no action was ever taken on his 
objection to the order. 
Plaintiff filed an affidavit of monthly expenses showing 
present monthly expense of $1,796.00 per month, her request for 
alimony would cover this with the exception of approximately 
$300. The problem with her affidavit is it is not a true 
indication of her expenses. It is more a wish list than a needs 
list. Example would be the transportation figure of some 
$531.00 a month and her testimony is she drives very little. 
Her personal expenses of $270.00 per month includes recreational 
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and travel of over $13 0.00 and she testified she does not travel 
and spends very little on recreation. Her food expenses total 
$350.00 a month simply is not realistic. It appears the 
affidavit is made more with the view to obtain high alimony than 
to advising the court of her actual expenses. 
I hold that the home is a marital asset and is to be 
subject to division between the parties. The home is to be 
sold. The plaintiff is to be awarded the first $19,672.00 which 
would be for her equity of her home prior to the marriage. 
After the expense of sale is deducted, the remaining equity is 
to be divided between the parties. 
The request for all of the home plus alimony is not 
realistic or fair. 
The plaintiff did obtain an order for temporary support 
of $1,500.00 a month, plaintiff has been unable to make these 
payments and is delinquent in the sum of $27,507. I order that 
the defendant is to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 per 
month. This $1,000.00 shall be a payment of $600.00 per month 
on the back alimony that was awarded and $4 00.00 per month on 
going. Plaintiff shall have the use and occupancy of the home 
until it is sold and the the defendant's lien thereon shall not 
draw interest. The payment of the $27,507.00 accumulated 
alimony at $600.00 a month will take 45 months to clear up and 
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this figure also shall not draw interest. The payment of the 
back award will take 3.8 years and by that time plaintiff should 
be employed on a full time basis. The $400.00 per month 
continuing alimony shall continue as an assistance fro her 
subsequent housing. 
Neither party has much retirement accumulated, however 
each shall have interest in the others per the Woodward formula. 
Plaintiff testified she did not know if health and accident 
insurance was available to her through her employment. If it is 
she should obtain that, if it is not, then the defendant is to 
assist in obtaining whatever benefit he can through his 
employment at her expense. 
His payment of $12,000.00 a year plus her current 
earnings even on a part time basis of $9,780.00 a year give her a 
gross income of almost $22,000.00 per year. This equates almost 
to a figure equal to what the family was living on when defendant 
was drawing $500.00 a week from the business prior to the 
separation and is a monthly amount greater than the amounts set 
out in the affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by the 
plaintiff. Therefore each party is to pay their own attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Defendant's counsel to prepare findings, conclusion, and 
judgment in accordance herewith. 
Memorandum Decision 
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DATED this <sj day of November, 1991, 
RONALD O. HYDE, Judge" 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ' day of November, 
1991, I sent $. true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision to counsel as follows: 
David B. Havas 
2604 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
I 
Don E. Cassity 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J? /^S 1/1/ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Tab 2 
DONN E. CASSITY (#594) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, ) 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) CASE NO. 890903214 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, ) RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter having come on for Trial on the 28th 
day of November, 1991, before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Judge, 
sitting without a jury, and the Court having heard the evidence 
presented in behalf of and by the Plaintiff, and in behalf of and 
by the Defendant, and the Court having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is now, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant should be and hereby 
are divorced from each other, said Decree of Divorce to become 
final upon execution by the Court and upon entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, 
2. That the real estate and improvements thereon accumulated 
by the parties, Plaintiff and Defendant, during the marriage, 
1 
commonly described as 151 West 5400 South, Washington Terrace, 
Weber County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as 
Lot 163, South Ridge Subdivision No. 
7 located in Weber County, State of 
Utah as Recorded in the Weber County 
Recorder's Office 
.should be and hereby is determined to be a marital asset. 
3. It is hereby ordered that the said real estate and 
improvements is to be forthwith listed for sale, and is to be sold, 
and the Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and all 
documents both with respect to the offering of the property for 
sale, and the closing and deeding of the property to the buyer, as 
will become necessary on a timely and appropriate basis, consistent 
with the need of sales persons, title company personnel, and the 
terms of the Sales Agreement between the Seller and the Buyer. The 
Plaintiff and Defendant are both ordered to be cooperative-in all 
respects with regard to the offering of ^ sale, and the closing of 
the sale of the said real estate and improvements. 
4. The Plaintiff should be and hereby is awarded from the net 
sale proceeds of the said real estate the first $19,672.00, and it 
is ordered that the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the 
real estate is to be paid one-half to the Plaintiff and one-half to 
the Defendant. 
5. Judgment for unpaid temporary alimony in the sum of 
$27,507.00 is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, and against the 
Defendant, said sum to be paid to the Defendant at the rate of 
$600.00 per.month, until the full.sum of $27,507.00 has been paid 
to the Plaintiff. 
2 
6. That ongoing alimony should be and hereby is ordered to be 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in the sum of $400.00 per 
month. 
7. That Plaintiff shall be permitted to use and occupy the 
residence of the parties until it is sold. Plaintiff is ordered to 
cooperate in all reasonable manner with the sales persons engaged 
in obtaining a qualified buyer for the said real estate. 
8. The Defendant shall have a lien for his portion of the 
equity in the real estate described in paragraph 3 above, which 
lien shall not draw interest, nor shall interest be incurred as to 
the Plaintiff's $19,672.00 sum to be paid out of the sale proceeds, 
nofr shall interest be paid or accumulate on the past due alimony 
awarded to the Plaintiff, in the sum of $27,507.00. 
9. That it is hereby ordered that based upon Woodward vs. 
Woodward, and the formula setforth therein for division of 
retirement income, that each of the parties shall have claim in the 
other parties retirement income to the extent it was earned by 
Plaintiff and Defendent as of October 28, 1991. 
10. It is ordered that the Plaintiff shall, if health and 
accident insurance is available to her through her employment, to 
obtain said insurance, and it is further ordered that in the event 
that it is not available to the Plaintiff at her employment, that 
the Defendant is to assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever 
insurance benefit, if any, he can for the Plaintiff through his own 
employment, at the expense of the Plaintiff. 
11. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant should, and it is 
3 
hereby Ordered that each party shall pay their own attorneys fees 
and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this jj4* day of £ W c**.* b^r~ ' 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this ^ ^ v d a y of November, 1991, I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to the 
Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her attorney, David Burt 
Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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Tab 3 
DONN E. CASSITY (#594) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) CASE NO- 890903214 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, ) JUDGE: RONALD O. HYDE 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt Havas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. Cassity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff having presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber 
1 
County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff, 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973. 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four 
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in 
the home and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial 
part of the support economically for the children, and which 
De ^ndant developed a very close and loving relationship with each 
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the 
present. 
4. . That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose 
between the parties, and they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed, 
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in 
Og n Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
2 
conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship. 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new home, she refused, stating, "My home is in 
Ogden, Utah" . The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
was protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
encumbered and a motorcycle. He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor 
home of the parties, which^the-Defendant-believed-had,^a value^of 
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but which at a later time the Plaintiff 
sold for $9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the 
Plaintiff all of the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and 
a 1980 Lincoln Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the 
vehicles were encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 
- $10,000.00 cash, or. the $9>000-.00 received by the-Plaintif f from 
sale of the motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant. 
10. That after it became obvious by April of 1987 that the 
Plaintiff was flatly refusing to rejoin the Defendant, as his "wife, 
the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed upon a divorce, and the 
Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff retain as her^sole-property 
all of the vehicles, money, house and lot, furniture* and- household 
furnishings, and other personal property that he- had' left • with 
Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the 
Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant. The 
Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as 
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
4 
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Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507-00. 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The Plaintiff house was sold. During the time that the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff1s home the 
Defendant made the mortgage payments. Defendant also essentially 
paid all of the mortgage payments on the- home' that the parties own 
at the present time, and which was purchased by the parties 
subsequent to the sale of the Plaintiff*s home, 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived in the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate. The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any. 
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck and a boat in which there is 
5 
essentially no equity. 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures* and all of the other personal 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17. That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500,00 per week which was used for family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue 
Services as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross 'pay of $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten weeks giving her a jross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
disabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
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a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however, 
Plaintiff*s Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the PlaintiffTs actual expenses. 
24. That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveved at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim 
7 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence'shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the PlaintiffT« nhi 1 rtrftn as his family, which fact 
supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in 
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to 
do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court. 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset. 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff Ts equity from her home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
8 
6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant. 
7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
327,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
time basis. 
11. That the Plaintiff ^should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither party has much retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense. 
9 
14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year -"for 3.8 
years from the defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00 or more, will* provide Plaintiff with a gross 
income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing- $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their own attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this J2^ day of /'Isy^wtA^C.. 1991, I certify that 
I mailed, postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt 
Havas, at his Office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a 
copy..of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
the above-entitled case. 
,^ f j] Q o^U^ 
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Tab 4 
DONN E . CASSITY ( # 5 9 4 ) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t 
1 1 5 S o c i a l H a l l A v e n u e 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 8 - 3 2 6 1 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, ) 
) ORDER 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v s . ) 
) CASE NO. 890903214 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, ) RONALD 0 . HYDE, JUDGE 
D e f e n d a n t * ) 
On the 9th day of January, 1992, et the hour of 10:00 a.in. the 
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findings of Fact in the above-
entitled matter came on for Hearing, end the Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant 
was not present but was represented by his counsel, Donn E. 
Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintiff's Motion by 
Plaintiff's counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for 
tr.e Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised 
in the premises does now 
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the 
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph 
9 of the Findings of Fact wherein on page 4, third line down, the 
words "which the Defendant believed had a value of $12,000.00 to 
$15,000.00, but" be deleted and the balance of said sentence in 
1 
said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further Ordered the 
Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by deleting the 
first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first word of the 
fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of those words as 
follows "That the parties had conversation regarding distribution 
of the marital assets, and the Defendant", and starting with the 
word "proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the 
balance of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the last sentence of Paragraph 12 
on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be amended by deleting the 
said sentence beginning with the word "Defendant" and ending with 
the word "home". 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by 
the Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital 
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real 
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of 
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the 
said marital real estate will notr because of Plaintiff's appeal, 
be timely paid to Defendant, due to Plaintiff's appeal of the 
Court's decision, that interest on the net equity of the Defendant 
in the said real estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from 
date of Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in 
2 
addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to 
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so long as 
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistant with the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the 
Court on December 4, 1991. 
The motion of the "Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on 
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been 
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied, it 
appearing tftat any delay in the performance of the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce with respect to payment of past due alimony to 
the Plaintiff/ by the Defendant, will be caused, if at all, solely 
by the Appeal of this case by the Plaintiff, 
The Order of the Court as to payment of interest to the 
Defendant, is not intended by the Court to limit any right 
Defendant otherwise has with respect to the marital estate. 
BY THE COURT: n . n J w Pj 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the /b r day of January, 1992, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order in the above-
entitled case to the Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her 
counsel., David Burt Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, 
Ogden, Utah 84401. 
j-
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Tab 5 
DONN E. CASSITY (#594, 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND IOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
P]aintiff, 
vs, 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 890903214 
JUDGE: RONALD O. HYDE 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt .lavas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. Cassity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff having presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and testimony, and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments, and the Court now being fully informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- That the PJ aintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber 
County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973. 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant four 
children, siblings of the Plaintiff from another marriage lived in 
the home and were raised substantially by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing a substantial 
part of the support economically for the children, and which 
Defendant developed a very close and loving relationship with each 
of Plaintiff's children, which relationship has continued to the 
present* 
4. That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose 
between the parties, and they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed, and, whose grocery business had been closed, 
and gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in 
Ogden Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
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conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship, 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot and, invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new home, she refused, stating, "My home is in 
Ogden, Utah". The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
v:as protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
3 
encumbered and a motorcycle. He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, a motor 
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for 
$9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also left with the Plaintiff all of 
the furniture, the house, lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln 
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the vehicles were 
encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00 
cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the 
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant* 
10. That the parties had irreconcilable differences. That the 
parries had conversation regarding distribution of the marital 
assets, and the Defendant proposed that the Plaintiff retain as her 
sole property all of the vehicles, money, house and lot, furniture 
end household furnishings, and other personal property that he had 
left with Plaintiff at the time Defendant went to Nevada, and that 
the Plaintiff forego any claim to alimony from the Defendant. The 
Defendant believed, until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff had agreed to accept the marital assets as 
her own, in lieu of any claim for alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
4 
temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507.00, 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The Plaintiff house was sold. During the time that the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant lived in the Plaintiff's home the 
Defendant made the mortgage payments. That following the 
separation of the parties the Defendant sent monies to the 
Plaintiff for some time thereafter• 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived in the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate• The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000 and for $85,000.00 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any. 
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck and a boat in which there is 
essentially no equity, 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal 
5 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17. That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used for family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United States Treasury Department. Internal Revenue 
Services as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross pay of $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
disabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
6 
23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796.00 per month, however, 
Plaintiff !s Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the Plaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the Plaintiff's actual expenses. 
24. That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brother 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit Claim 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact 
7 
supports Defendants version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him in 
Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused to 
do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LftW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
n c u wt^ -L • 
2. That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court, 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Keber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset* 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from the sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff's equity from her home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant. 
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7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should nor be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
Co-ITlS D 3 S I S . 
11. That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither party has much retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
through her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendants employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense. 
14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8 
years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00 or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross 
9 
income of almost $22,000.00 per year, which is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties
 f an(j represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set ou^ in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Flai'nti't't". Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their
 o w n attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED thife <Si£ day of Sifeary, 1992. 
BY THE-COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
7 ^ 
On this J(^ <^day of January, 1992, I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the Plaintiff's attorney, David Burt Havas, at 
his office at ^604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 844C1, a copy cf the 
foregoing Amelia Findings of Fact and Conclusion's of Law in the 
above-entitle^ case. 
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Tab 6 
DONN E. CASSITY (#594) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, ) 
) AMENDED ORDER 
PHaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) CASE NO. 890903214 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, ) RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE 
Defendant. ) 
On the 9th day of January, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. the 
Motion of the Plaintiff to Amend Findir gs of Fact in the above-
entitled matter came on for Hearing, and the Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her counsel, David Burt Havas, and the Defendant 
was not present but was represented by his counsel, Donn E. 
Cassity, and after argument in behalf of Plaintiff's Motion by 
PlaintiffTs counsel, and the objection and argument of counsel for 
the Defendant, Donn E. Cassity, the Court now being fully advised 
in the premises does now 
ORDER that the Findings of Fact heretofore executed by the 
Court on the 4th day of December, 1991, be amended as to Paragraph 
3 so as to be factually and grammatically correct, amended as to 
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact, wherein on page 4, third line 
down, the words "wha-ch the Defendant believed had a value of 
1 
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00, but" be deleted and the balance of said 
sentence in said Paragraph 9 be left as written, and it is further 
Ordered the Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact be amended by 
deleting the first three lines of Paragraph 10 including the first 
word of the fourth line of Paragraph 10, and insert in place of 
those words as follows "That the Defendant testified that the 
parties had conversation regarding distribution of the marital 
assets, and that the Defendant", and starting with the word 
"proposed" in the fourth line of the Findings of Fact the balance 
of the Paragraph 10 is to remain as previously written, excepting 
that the last sentence of Paragraph 10 will read as follows: "The 
Defendant testified that until the Complaint for divorce was filed 
by the Plaintiff that the Defendant believed that Plaintiff had 
agreed with him to accept the marital assets as her own in lieu of 
Plaintiff making any claim for alimony jrom the Defendant." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the third and fourth sentences of 
Paragraph 12 on Page 5 of the Findings of Fact shall be deleted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further amendments proposed by 
tne Plaintiff are approved, and are hereby denied, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event sale of the marital 
real estate and division of the net proceeds thereof are upheld by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, that in view of the fact that the real 
estate of the parties commonly known as 151 West 5400 South 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is by decree of 
divorce ordered to be sold, and since the Defendant's equity in the 
said marital real estate will not, because of Plaintiff's appeal, 
2 
be timely paid to Defendant due to Plaintiff's appeal of the 
Court's decision that interest on the net equity of the Defendant 
in the said re&l estate, when it is sold, shall bear interest from 
date of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Defendant in 
addition to the principal amount of the net sales price awarded to 
Defendant, following sale of the marital real estate, so long as 
the Defendant pays the Plaintiff alimony consistent with the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce, executed and entered by the 
Court on December 4, 1991. 
The Motion of the Plaintiff that she be awarded interest on 
the Plaintiff's Judgment for delinquent alimony that has been 
awarded Plaintiff by the Court should be and hereby is denied. 
The Orde^* of the Court as to payment of interest to the 
Defendant, i£ not intended by the Coart to limit any right 
Defendant otherwise has with respect to "the marital estate. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE RONALD 0. HYDE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the / 7 ^ day of April, 1992, I mailed, 
3 
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order in the above-
entitled case to the Plaintiff by mailing a copy thereof to her 
counsel, David Burt Havas, at his office at 2604 Madison Avenue, 
Ogden, Utah 84401. 
Y) 
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Tab 7 
DONN E. CASSITY (#594) 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
115 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3261 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOY A. HOAGLAND, 
VS, 
COLIN G. HOAGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 890903214 
JUDGE: RONALD 0. HYDE 
The above-entitled matter came on for Trial before the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, Second Judicial District Court Judge for 
Weber County, sitting without a Jury, at 9:30 a.m. on the 28th day 
of October, 1991, and the Plaintiff, Joy A. Hoagland, and her 
attorney, David Burt Havas, were present, and the Defendant, Colin 
G. Hoagland, and his attorney, Donn E. Cassity, were present, and 
the Plaintiff having presented her testimony, exhibits and 
evidence, and the Defendant having presented his testimony, 
exhibits and evidence, and the attorneys having made their closing 
arguments and the Court now being fully informed in the premises, 
now makes its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff,. Joy A. Hoagland, resided in Weber 
County, State of Utah in excess of 90 days prior to the filing of 
the Complaint in the above-entitled matter by the Plaintiff. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Elko, 
Nevada on the 5th day of September, 1973. 
3. That no children were born as issue of the marriage, but 
from the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
four children, each borne of the Plaintiff from a prior marriage 
lived in the parties home and were raised by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, with the Defendant, Step-Father, providing the 
substantial part of the support economically for the children, 
during which time the Defendant developed a very close and loving 
relationship with each of Plaintiff's children, which relationship 
has continued to the present* 
4. That during the year of 1986 marital problems arose 
between the parties, and they were separated twice for a few weeks 
but were reunited near the end of 1986, at which time the Defendant 
who was unemployed and whose grocery business had been closed, and 
gone through Bankruptcy, left the residence of the parties in Ogden 
Utah to seek employment, which he found in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
5. That when the Plaintiff married the Defendant he was an 
employee of Smiths, a grocery company business, but later Defendant 
quit his employment at Smiths and opened his own grocery store, 
which business was operated until August of 1986, at which time the 
Defendant and his brother closed the business and filed the 
Business Corporation in Bankruptcy. 
6. That prior to the closing of the business the Defendant 
2 
conveyed title to the residence and lot of the parties to the 
Plaintiff as a security against the possibility that Creditors 
might claim against the real and/or personal property of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. No such claim was ever made by any 
Creditor, however. 
7. That during 1986 the parties developed serious problems in 
their marriage relationship, 
8. That the Defendant in January of 1987 found gainful 
employment in Las Vegas, Nevada, again working for Smiths in the 
grocery business. After being settled in Las Vegas in his new 
employment, Defendant purchased a newly constructed residence and 
lot, and invited the Plaintiff to come to Las Vegas. At the time 
of the visit the Defendant showed the Plaintiff the house, but when 
the Defendant asked her to move to Nevada so they could live 
together in the new home, she refused, stating, "My home is in 
Ogden, Utah". The Defendant told the Plaintiff that they could 
lease the home in Ogden and thus retain it, and that a good 
business friend in Ogden would manage it and make certain that it 
was protected in their absence. The Plaintiff refused to move to 
Nevada, and effectively the parties were then separated and have 
never since that period lived together. The marital parties have, 
and have had irreconcilable differences since at least April of 
1987. 
9. That at the time Defendant left the parties home in his 
pursuit of employment in Nevada the Defendant took with him some 
$300.00 plus dollars, together with a pick-up truck that was 
3 
encumbered and a motorcycle. 'He left in the possession of the 
Plaintiff approximately $8,000.00 to $10,000.00 in cash, the motor 
home of the parties, which at a later time the Plaintiff sold for 
$9,000.00 cash. The Defendant also 1 eft with the Plaintiff all of 
the furniture, the house lot, swimming pool, and a 1980 Lincoln 
Town Car, and a 1976 Chevrolet. None of the vehicles were 
encumbered at that time. That none of the $8,000.00 - $10,000.00 
cash, or the $9,000.00 received by the Plaintiff from sale of the 
motor home was shared by Plaintiff with the Defendant. 
10* That the parties had irreconcilable differences. That 
the Defendant testified that the parties had conversation regarding 
distribution of the marital assets, and that the Defendant proposed 
that the Plaintiff retain as her sole property all of the vehicles, 
money, house and lot, furniture - end household furnishings, and 
other personal property that he had left with the Plaintiff at the 
time Defendant went to Nevada, and that the Plaintiff forego any 
claim to alimony from the Defendant. The Defendant testified that 
until the Complaint for Divorce was filed by the Plaintiff that he 
believed that Plaintiff had agreed with him to accept the marital 
assets as * her own, in lieu of Plaintiff making any claim for 
alimony from the Defendant. 
By the time the Complaint in the above matter was filed by the 
Plaintiff the Defendant had been transferred by his employer from 
Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada. 
11. A Hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held in the 
absence of the Defendant, he being in Nevada at his work, and an 
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Order for temporary alimony was ordered by the Court in the sum of 
$1,500.00 per month. That at the time of Trial of the case, 
temporary unpaid alimony had accrued in the total sum of 
$27,507.00. 
12. That at the time of the marriage of the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant the Plaintiff had an equity in a house and lot and the 
Plaintiff and Defendant lived in the said house for a period of 
time. The PlaintiffTs house was sold. That following the 
separation of the parties the Defendant sent monies to the 
Plaintiff for some time thereafter. 
13. That since the separation of the parties the Plaintiff 
temporarily had a daughter and a child live with her, but otherwise 
Plaintiff has lived in the home, alone, since the separation of the 
parties. The home is a four bedroom, two level home, with swimming 
pool, patio and covered porch, two car garage within the house, and 
no mortgage is owing on the said real estate. The house and lot 
have been appraised twice, for $97,000.00 and for $85,000.00. 
14. That neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant has much 
retirement benefits accumulated, if any. 
15. That since the filing of the divorce the Defendant has 
been transferred from Reno, Nevada by his employer to Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Defendant has purchased a house and lot in Glendale, 
Arizona, and a pick-up truck, and a boat in which there is 
essentially no equity. 
16. That the Plaintiff has had the sole use of the parties 
real estate, furniture, fixtures and all of the other personal 
5 
property accumulated by the parties during the marriage since the 
separation of the parties in December of 1986. 
17- That the Plaintiff had not become accustomed to a high 
standard of living during the marriage, it appearing from the 
evidence that prior to Defendant's business failing in 1986 he was 
grossing approximately $500.00 per week which was used ifor family 
needs. The parties income tax returns for years prior thereto 
indicate actual income considerably less. 
18. Plaintiff is employed currently as she has been for some 
time with the United States Treasury Department, Internal Revenue 
Service as a GS-5 Step One with a gross yearly salary of 
$16,973.00, and a part-time gross pay op $8,280.00, plus 
unemployment for ten weeks giving her a gross income of $9,780.00 
per year. 
19. Plaintiff testified that she would receive an increased 
income when she returns to work in 1992. 
20. That the Plaintiff's employment history indicates that 
she graduated from High School in 1953 and has basically worked in 
clerking positions or assembly line positions, and has never earned 
a high income. 
21. Plaintiff's health is good and she suffers no 
cisabilities. 
22. Defendant after reobtaining employment with Smiths became 
a Store Manager, but he developed Rheumatoid Arthritis and has had 
to down grade his job to that of a buyer, and his income will be 
approximately $56,000.00 per annum. 
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23. That Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of monthly expenses 
showing present monthly expenses of $1,796,00 per month, however, 
PlaintiffTs Affidavit is more a wish list than a needs list. 
An example of that fact is that the transportation figure that 
the Plaintiff uses in her monthly expenses list shows $531.00 for 
transportation expense though her testimony is that she drives very 
little. She also indicates that her personal expenses of $270.00 
per month includes recreational and travel of over $130.00, and she 
testified that she does not travel and spends very little money on 
recreation. In addition, she recites that her food expenses 
totalled $350.00 per month which is not a realistic sum to spend 
for one person, and reflects a desire on the part of the PDaintiff 
to obtain high alimony rather than reasonably advising the Court of 
the PlaintiffTs actual expenses. 
24. That the Plaintiff claims that the house and lot in 
Washington Terrace was deeded to her in ^ exchange for any claim she 
had against ownership of the grocery store business that was 
operated by the Defendant and his brother. 
25. The Court finds, however, that the Deed was conveyed at 
a time when the grocery business of the Defendant and his brcther 
was closing down and near Bankruptcy and ultimately went into 
Bankruptcy, and that there was little, or no value in the business 
at the time of the conveyance by Defendant of title by Quit-Claim 
Deed to the Plaintiff. 
26. The evidence shows that the Defendant still, at this 
date, looks at the Plaintiff's children as his family, which fact 
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supports Defendant's version that he wanted Plaintiff to join him 
in Las Vegas to continue the marriage, but that Plaintiff refused 
to do so. 
27. The Plaintiff claims that no such discussion of her 
moving to Nevada took place, but Plaintiff does acknowledge that 
Plaintiff and Defendant did discuss renting out the residence and 
lot in Washington Terrace, Ogden, Utah. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. That the parties have irreconcilable differences one with 
the other, and they should be divorced from each other, and the 
divorce should be final upon execution and entry by the Court. 
3. That the residence and lot located at 151 West 5400 South, 
Washington Terrace, Weber County, State of Utah, is a marital 
asset* 
4. That the said real estate should be sold. 
5. That from The sale proceeds, the Plaintiff should be 
awarded, the first $19,672.00, without interest, representing 
Plaintiff's equity from her prior home prior to the marriage of the 
parties. 
6. That after the expenses of sale are deducted the balance 
of the remaining equity should be divided, one-half to the 
Plaintiff, and one-half to the Defendant. 
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7. That the Court determines that there is delinquent alimony 
owed to the Plaintiff in the sum of $27,507.00. 
8. That the Plaintiff should be awarded on going alimony. 
9. That the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$600.00 per month in liquidation of the delinquent alimony sum of 
$27,507.00, which the Court calculates will take 45.845 months, and 
the Defendant should not be required to pay interest on the 
delinquent alimony. 
10. The payment of the back alimony will take Defendant 3.82 
years, and by that time the Plaintiff should be employed on a full 
time basis. 
11. That the Plaintiff should have the use and occupancy of 
the parties house and lot until it is sold, and the Defendant's 
lien on the equity in the real estate should not draw interest. 
12. That neither paxty has much retirement benefits 
accumulated, but each should have an interest in the others 
retirement per the Woodward v. Woodward formula. 
13. If the Plaintiff can obtain health and accident insurance 
inrough her employment she should obtain that, but if the said 
insurance is not available to the Plaintiff then the Defendant 
should assist the Plaintiff in obtaining whatever medical benefit, 
if any, she can through Defendant's employment, at the Plaintiff's 
expense. 
14. The Plaintiff in receiving $12,000.00 a year for 3.8 
years from the Defendant, plus her current earnings on a part time 
basis of $9,780.00, or more, will provide Plaintiff with a gross 
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income of almost $22,000*00 per year, which 'is almost equal to the 
income which the parties were living on when the Defendant was 
drawing $500.00 per week from his business prior to the separation 
of the parties, and represents a monthly amount greater than the 
amounts set out in the Affidavit of monthly expenses as filed by 
the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and the Defendant should 
each pay their own attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this / 7 ^ day of April, 1992, I certify that I mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the PlaintiffTs attorney, David Burt Havas, at 
nis office at 2604 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, a copy of the 
foregoing Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
the above-entitled case. 
U 6 0" 
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Tab 8 
15-1-2 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed, 
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2, 15-l-2a (L. 1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to 
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, § 1241x; C.L. maximum interest rates on loans and condi-
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933, 44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, tional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws 
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; 1969, ch. 18, § 9.103. 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is men-
tioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate 
mentioned by the year. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241x5; C.L. 1917, § 3326; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 42. 
Key Numbers. — Interest &=> 40. 
15-1-4, Interest on judgments . 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, Cross-References. — Interest to be in-
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. eluded in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Proce-
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2.
 d u r e , Rule 54(e). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment increased the interest rate from 8% to 
12%. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Allowance of interest before judgment. 
Amendment of judgment. 
Collection of interest. 
Eminent domain. 
Estates of decedents. 
Federal court judgment. 
Interest during pendency of appeal. 
Late payment of property division in divorce action. 
Personal judgments. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Reinstatement of judgment. 
Renewal of judgment. 
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Tab 9 
DIVORCE 30-3-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Both parties at fault. 
Cruel treatment. 
Both parties at fault. 
Marriage may be dissolved by making a 
grant of divorce to each party where each was 
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 
2d 82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971). 
Cruel treatment. 
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to 
cause great mental distress need not be aggra-
vated and more severe when directed toward 
the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 
1975). 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of money for the 
separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and 
to enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1210; 
C.L. 1917, § 2998; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-3-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appealability of order. 
Appeal from order. 
Attorney fees. 
Attorney fees for appeal. 
Attorney's lien on alimony. 
Contempt proceedings. 
Contesting petitioner for modification. 
Costs and expenses on appeal. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Enforcement of order or decree. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mandamus. 
Order of court. 
Stipulation and effect thereof. 
Appealability of order. 
Formal order made in divorce action, called a 
judgment" directing that judgment be entered 
for benefit of defendant's attorneys, is not final 
and appealable. Rolando v. District Court, 72 
Utah 459, 271 P. 225 (1928). 
Appeal from order. 
Where there were no findings or evidence in 
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court re-
manded issue for disposition by trial court but 
allowed wife's attorney $100 for services ren-
dered with reference to husband's appeal from 
judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish, v. 
Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934). 
Supreme Court assumed that evidence sup-
ported award of suit money to wife where no 
testimony as to wife's need was before the 
court on appeal on judgment roll from the de-
cree of no cause of action in husband and 
awarding of expenses of suit, attorney's fees 
and temporary alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Attorney fees. 
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in 
divorce proceeding was not inadequate even 
though husband- was worth approximately 
$40,000, where proceedings from time of com-
mencement until entry of decree lasted less 
than two months and trial itself was completed 
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 
306, 121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269, 1914D 
Ann. Cas. 989 (1912). 
Where decree of divorce was obtained by 
mother of minor children against father, who 
was required to pay certain sum periodically 
for support, care, maintenance, and education 
of such children, and he, without sufficient 
cause, refused to comply with decree, as result 
of which mother was compelled to bring pro-
ceedings against him, father was required to 
pay counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. 
Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921). 
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to 
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of 
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925). 
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife 
petitioned to require husband to show cause 
why he should not be punished for contempt for 
failure to pay support money and husband filed 
cross-petition for modification of decree and 
where it was shown that wife was without 
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel. 
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P.2d 198 
(1943). 
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses 
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30-3-10.6 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
in the order or decree shall be due one-half by the 5th day of each month, and 
the remaining one-half by the 20th day of that month. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 78, § 1. 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the 
date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a 
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdic-
tion, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obli-
gee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and en-
forceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying 
on the public record, shall be reduced to an administrative or judicial judg-
ment for a specific amount and docketed in the district court in accordance 
with Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-l 1-309. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L. 1988, in the introductory paragraph of Subsec-
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch. tion (1) substituted "62A-11-401" for 
203, § 1. "78-45d-l." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- The 1988 amendment, by Chapter 203, effec-
ment, by Chapter 1, effective January 19, tive April 25, 1988, added Subsection (4). 
30-3-11. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55, and family relationships, was repealed by 
§ 2), declaring a public policy to foster marital Laws 1961, ch. 59, § 2. 
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. 
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to strengthen the family life 
foundation of our society and reduce the social and economic costs to the state 
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable measures to preserve 
marriages, particularly where minor children are involved. The purposes of 
this act are to protect the rights of children and to promote the public welfare 
by preserving and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony by 
providing the courts with further assistance for family counseling, the recon-
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